

WEST Search History

DATE: Tuesday, August 05, 2008

Hide? Set Name Query**Hit Count***DB=USPT; PLUR=YES; OP=ADJ*

<input type="checkbox"/>	L32	L28 and (first hash value)	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	L31	L28 and multiplexer	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	L30	L28 and multiplexer\$.clm.	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	L29	L28 and multiplexer.clm.	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	L28	L25 and (trusted).clm.	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	L27	L25 and (trusted hardware).clm.	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	L26	L25 and hash.clm.	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	L25	L24	1

DB=PGPB,USPT,USOC; PLUR=YES; OP=ADJ

<input type="checkbox"/>	L24	L19 and trusted.clm.	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	L23	L20 and (virtual machine monitor).clm.	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	L22	L20 and VMM.clm.	1
<input type="checkbox"/>	L21	L20 and ((virtual machine) near monitor\$.clm.	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	L20	((store or storing) same (hash value)).clm.	639
<input type="checkbox"/>	L19	L18	3

DB=PGPB,USPT,USOC,EPAB,JPAB,DWPI,TDBD; PLUR=YES; OP=ADJ

<input type="checkbox"/>	L18	L17 and hash.clm.	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	L17	L16 or L15	39
<input type="checkbox"/>	L16	((load or loading) same (VMM)).clm.	22
<input type="checkbox"/>	L15	((load or loading) same ((virtual machine) near monitor\$)).clm.	31
<input type="checkbox"/>	L14	((load or loading) and ((virtual machine) near monitor\$)).clm.	72
<input type="checkbox"/>	L13	((load or loading) and((virtual machine) near monitor\$)).clm.	72
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<input type="checkbox"/>	L11	(virtual machine or VM) and trust\$	2950
<input type="checkbox"/>	L10	L9 and hash value	109
<input type="checkbox"/>	L9	L8 and hash\$	377
<input type="checkbox"/>	L8	L7 or VMM	2226
<input type="checkbox"/>	L7	(virtual machine) near monitor\$	1328
<input type="checkbox"/>	L6	L5 and (trust\$ or hash\$)	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	L5	L4 and ((virtual machine) near monitor\$)	11
<input type="checkbox"/>	L4	(L3 or L2)	4300
<input type="checkbox"/>	L3	717/120-123,126-127.ccls.	2348
<input type="checkbox"/>	L2	(717/120 717/121 717/127 717/174 717/175 717/176 717/177 717/178).ccls.	3747
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L26: Entry 1 of 1

File: USPT

May 22, 2007

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TITLE: Method and system to support a trusted set of operational environments using emulated trusted hardware

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CLAIMS:

What is claimed is:

1. A method for implementing trusted operations within a

computing system using an emulated trusted platform module (TPM), comprising: loading a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to support a virtual machine (VM) session; loading the VM session; loading an operating system (OS) into the VM session; and emulating a trusted platform module (TPM) to hold a key associated with the VM session and to execute trusted operations; determining whether the OS is trustworthy using the key held within the emulated TPM; and terminating the VM sessions along with the OS, if the OS is determined to be untrustworthy.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein emulating the TPM comprises emulating the TPM under the control of the VMM, the VMM to prevent unauthorized access to the key held within the emulated TPM.

3. The method of claim 2 wherein the VMM comprises a layer of software executing below the VM session and having a higher privileged access to system resources than the OS.

4. The method of claim 3 wherein TPM commands originating from within the VM session to execute the trusted operations are trapped and redirected to the emulated TPM.

5. The method of claim 1 wherein determining whether the OS is trustworthy comprises determining whether the OS has an unauthorized modification via: hashing at least a portion of the OS to obtain a hash value; and comparing the hash value to the key held within the emulated TPM.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: loading a plurality of VM sessions and a plurality of OS's, each one

of the plurality of OS's loaded into one of the plurality of VM sessions; and emulating a plurality of TPMs each corresponding to one of the plurality of VM sessions, each of the plurality of TPMs to hold a key associated with the corresponding one of the plurality of VM sessions and to execute trusted operations.

7. The method of claim 6, further comprising: determining whether each of the plurality of OS's is trustworthy using the key associated with each of the plurality of VM sessions; and terminating any of the plurality of VM sessions supporting an OS determined to be untrustworthy.

8. The method of claim 1 wherein the trusted operations include at least one of encrypting data, decrypting data, hashing, and sealing data to a software environment.

9. The method of claim 1, further comprising: denying the OS access to a network domain, if the OS is determined to be untrustworthy.

10. The method of claim 9 wherein denying the OS access to the network domain comprises a management module of a rack of blade servers denying a blade server, executing the OS within the VM session access to the network domain.

11. The method of claim 1 wherein the emulated TPM simulates the functionality of a hardware TPM compliant with a Trusted Computing Group's (TCG) trusted platform architecture.

12. A machine-readable storage medium that provides instructions that, when executed by a machine, will cause the machine to perform operations for implementing trusted operations within a computing system using an emulated trusted platform module (TPM), comprising: executing a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to support a virtual machine (VM) session; executing the VM session; executing an operating system (OS) within the VM session; and emulating a trusted platform module (TPM) to hold a key associated with the VM session, the VMM to prevent unauthorized access to the key, wherein emulating the TPM further comprises emulating the TPM to allow software applications executing within the OS to establish trust via TPM commands.

13. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 12 wherein the VMM comprises a layer of software executing below the VM session and having a higher privileged access to system resources than the OS.

14. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 12 wherein the TPM commands are trapped and redirected to the emulated TPM.

15. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 12, further providing instructions that, if executed by the machine, will cause the machine to perform operations, comprising: determining whether the OS is trustworthy using the key held within the emulated TPM; and terminating the VM session along with the OS, if the OS is determined to be untrustworthy.

16. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 15 wherein determining whether the OS is trustworthy comprises determining whether the OS has an unauthorized modification

via: hashing at least a portion of the OS to obtain a hash value; and comparing the hash value to the key.

17. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 12, further providing instructions that, if executed by the machine, will cause the machine to perform operations, comprising: executing the VMM to support a plurality of VM sessions; executing a plurality of VM sessions; executing a plurality of OS's, each one of the plurality of OS's executed within one of the plurality of VM sessions; and emulating a plurality of TPMs each corresponding to one of the plurality of VM sessions, each of the plurality of TPMs to hold a key associated with the corresponding one of the plurality of VM sessions.

18. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 17, further providing instructions that, if executed by the machine will cause the machine to perform operations, comprising: determining whether each of the plurality of OS's is trustworthy using the key associated with each of the plurality of VM sessions; and terminating any of the plurality of VM sessions supporting an OS determined to be untrustworthy.

19. A system for implementing trusted operations within a computing system using an emulated trusted platform module (TPM), comprising: a processor to execute a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to support a virtual machine (VM) session; system memory communicatively coupled to the processor; and a data storage unit (DSU) communicatively coupled to the processor and the system memory and having instructions stored therein to generate the VMM and the emulated trusted platform module (TPM), the processor coupled to load the VMM from the DSU into the system memory, the VM session to support an operating system (OS) therein, the emulated TPM to execute trusted operations, wherein the DSU comprises a

firmware unit and the VMM comprises a firmware layer to execute below the VM session, the VMM having a higher privileged access to the system memory.

20. The system of claim 19 wherein the emulated TPM is further to securely hold a key for executing at least a portion of the trusted operations.

21. The system of claim 20 wherein the VMM prevents unauthorized access to the key securely held by the emulated TPM via hiding a memory location of the key.

22. The system of claim 21 wherein the processor is further coupled to execute the VMM and the emulated TPM to determine whether the OS is trustworthy via executing one of the trusted operations using the key and to terminate the VM session along with the OS, if the OS is determined to be untrustworthy.

23. The system of claim 19 wherein the emulated TPM emulates the functionality of a TPM compliant with a Trusted Computing Group's (TCG) trusted platform architecture.

24. A system for implementing trusted operations within a server system using an emulated trusted platform module (TPM), comprising: a management module; a plurality of blades mounted within a chassis and communicatively coupled to the management module, the plurality of blades each including a data storage unit (DSU) having stored therein instructions to generate the emulated trusted platform module (TPM) to hold a key; and a switch communicatively

coupled to the management module and the plurality of blades, the switch to provide the plurality of blades access to a network domain, the switch to deny access of a blade to the network domain, if that one of the plurality of blades is determined to be untrustworthy based on the key.

25. The system of claim 24 wherein the DSU of each of the plurality of blades has further stored therein instructions to generate a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to protect the emulated TPM from unauthorized access and to support a virtual machine (VM) session, the VM session to support an operating system (OS) therein.

26. The system of claim 25 wherein the one of the plurality of blades is determined to be untrustworthy based on the key, if a hash of a portion of the OS fails to correspond to the key.

27. The system of claim 25 wherein the key comprises a private key and wherein the one of the plurality of blades is determined to be untrustworthy, if the private key fails to correspond to a public key obtained from a trusted third party.

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